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National Resilience to Protracted Violence in Ukraine
Abstract
This paper concentrates on the production of power of the Ukrainian nation, that not only deals with
continuous violence within the nation, but also develops national strength to address this violence. This
paper aims to explore how the Ukrainian nation develops resilience to protracted violence as a form of
transformative power and what factors contribute or impede this process. The paper defines resilience as
a form of power that enhances the capacity of a national community to heal from trauma, effectively
resists perpetrators of violence, and positively transform intergroup relations to remove communities
from contexts of chronic violence and war. Based on semi-structured interviews with twenty-six
respondents and a phenomenological analysis of data, this paper shows that effective practices of
resilience developed by the national community of Ukraine, including volunteerism, a critical approach to
history, and dialogue, not only aid Ukrainians in the adaptation to the chronic violence but also in the
transformation of the nature and the impact of the violence on the national community. At the same time,
these practices not only utilize external and internal resources but shape the societal capacities and the
international interventions. Finally, these practices also alter visions of the society and dynamics of
relations between power agents.
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Author Bio(s)
Karina V. Korostelina is Professor at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason
University and Director of the Program on History, Memory and Conflict. She has served as a Fulbright
New Century Scholar, Rockefeller Writing Fellow, Fellow at the Eckert Institute for International Textbook
Research, Institute for Advanced Studies at Waseda University, Northeast Asia Foundation, and the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and a visiting scholar at the Central European
University. Her scholarship has been supported by 40 grants. The results of her research have been
presented at numerous international conferences and in more than 90 articles and chapters. She is an
author or editor of 16 books, including Social Identity and Conflict: Structure, Dynamic and Implications
(2007), History Education in the Formation of Social Identity: Toward a Culture of Peace (2013),
Constructing Narrative of Identity and Power (2013), International Insult: How Offence Contribute to
Conflict (2014), and Trump Effect (2016).

This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol27/iss2/4

National Resilience to Protracted Violence in Ukraine
Karina V. Korostelina
Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has been in a state of permanent
armed conflict (International Criminal Court, 2017). While the intensity of the violence differs
through this period, pressures on the society, including civilian devastation, military causality,
and protracted displacement, continue to impact the life of Ukrainian citizens. In comparison to
the analyses of the power dynamics between Russia and Ukraine represented in many research,
this paper concentrates on the dynamics of power within the Ukrainian nation that help not only
deal with the continuous violence but also develop the national strength to address it. Resilience
“means more than effectively returning to normal functioning after a disruption, although it is
critical. It is about achieving significant transformation that yields benefits” (Rodin, 2014, p. 3).
While extensive scholarship addresses national resilience through the lens of critical
infrastructure and national security, this paper analyzes a nation as a multilayered community
and defines the process of resilience as adaptive cycles occurring at different spatial, temporal,
and societal levels. National resilience is defined as addressing adversaries and crises through
adaptation and transformation that preserve core national values and institutions, as well as
create new innovative ways of addressing emerging needs and fragilities (Canetti, WaismelManor, Cohen, & Rapaport, 2013; Friedland, 2006; Kirschenbaum, 2006). The process of
resilience as “never-ending adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring, and renewal”
(Holling, 2000, p. 7) is based on power dynamics within the nation. Consequently, I define and
operationalize the resilience of a nation as a process enhancing a capacity of a national
community to address conflict through adaptation, effectively resisting perpetrators of violence,
and positively transforming intergroup relations removing communities from the contexts of
chronic violence and war. This study asks what components constitute the resilience of the
Ukrainian nation and what practices of resilience aim for effective trauma healing, resistance to
violence, and the positive transformation of relations within this nation.
Approaches to Community Resilience
Community Resilience as a Form of Power
The most developed resilience approach—ecological—analyzes resilience as both a
product of interactions between people and their environment, as well as a process that defines

this outcome (Benson & Lerner, 2003; Masten, 2001). However, some scholars have suggested
that the theoretical foundations of “social-ecological systems” are problematic because they
overemphasize the integrated nature of human societies and overlook the role of power, human
agency, and structural arrangements (Brown, 2014; Cote & Nightingale, 2012). They also lack a
commitment to the social justice framework (Aranda & Hart, 2015). Many studies underline the
crucial role of power dynamics and collective action among social groups for the development of
resilience. However, these studies overlook important social processes connected to contestation,
power asymmetries, and social difference (Brown, 2014; Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Fabinyi,
Louisa, & Foale, 2014, p. 28). The newly developed phenomenological approach to resilience
advocates analyzing complex interplay of individual agency, power, situational context, and
processes of improvisation in everyday life (Barton, 2005).
Despite this variety of definitions, the approaches to resilience suggest that it is going
beyond an absence of pathology to embrace competencies as crucial components (Luther &
Zigler, 1991). Resilience involves not only coping and successfully dealing with change, but also
learning and adapting to the new environment, and changing communities based on the
utilization of past experiences (Lengnick-Hall, Beck & Lengnick-Hall, 2011; Avey, Luthans, &
Jensen, 2009; Näswall, Kuntz, Hodliffe, & Malinen, 2013), it represents transformative power of
the communities. In this paper, I employ three core processes of resilience that reflect this type of
power: (1) the capacity to heal and resist, (2) active adaptation, and (3) successful
transformation.
Power dynamics within a nation include interactions between sustained institutions,
social groups, and social networks producing collective actions. Nations as communities can use
their capacities and external resources to establish practices that address conflict and violence as
well. As open, dynamic, and adaptive systems, nations are able to adopt to or alter various
political, economic, environmental, demographic, or societal pressures and to manage
opportunities and risks peacefully and stably (EU, 2016). Resilience as a form of power is rooted
in a national community’s strategies, energies, and choices for fostering collective well-being
(Rose, 1996). More complex forms of power-sharing within a nation help citizens to deal with
social fragilities and violence. This power approach to resilience shifts the locus of production of
knowledge and meaning from institutional actors to communities (Foucault, 101).
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Resilience in a Situation of Protracted Violence
In settings where protracted conflicts expose people to continuous violence, many
scholars concentrate on the coping dimension of their resilience. The scholars underscore
important links between resilience, danger, and stress, and emphasize specific coping strategies
in situations of armed conflict, including positive views of the future, safe havens, religiosity,
community links, established routines, and clubs and schools (Charles, 2010; Cummings et al.,
2011; Eshel & Kimhi, 2016; Freud & Burlingham, 1943; Masten, 2011; Sagi-Schwartz, 2008;
Scott, Poulin, & Silver, 2012; Wessells, 2016). The context in which coping takes place,
including relational dynamics of collective, institutional, and political spheres, is central to
understanding the effectiveness of the coping strategy (Vindevogel, 2017; Yablon, 2015).
Adaptation and transformation as parts of resilience processes utilized by the victimized
communities are deeply rooted in social support structures based on networks, such as the family
or the community, the participation in elections, and political and other collective action within
their community. For example, political involvement in the community is higher among people
who directly experienced violence during war (Bellows & Miguel, 2009; Shewfelt, 2009).
Specifically, community leadership is often comprised of civilians who witnessed war-related
violence (Blattman, 2009). Exposure to violence is also connected to increased altruistic
behavior towards members of communities and higher motivation to take risks to protect the
community (Voors et al., 2012). However, as other studies show, this increased involvement of
victims in political participation depends on the effectiveness of social programs (Gilligan,
Mvukiyehe, & Samii, 2012). Thus, the community’s involvement and political participation of
the victims of both war and criminal violence depends on the social and political environment
including community support and social networks.
Similarly, multiple studies sought to analyze both challenges to resilience and the social
and psychological factors that contribute to communal resilience, although the findings of such
studies are inconclusive. Strong community resilience has been linked to the application of longterm recovery plans, the active engagement of nongovernmental or civil society organizations,
and adherence to principles of social justice (Chandra et al., 2011). Some studies underscore
socio-demographic factors such as the size and type of community, age, and socioeconomic
strength. For example, researchers found that urban residents mostly rely upon personal
resources, while in rural neighborhoods, resilience is based on community connections (Braun3

Lewensohn & Sagy, 2014). Age also appears to be an important factor to resilience, with
middle-aged residents of communities better able to cope, adapt, and transform in situations of
chorionic violence as compared to a younger generation (Jaques, 1995).
Several factors were found to impact the resilience of communities, including levels of
preparedness, communality, and religiosity (Goroshit & Eshel, 2013). Among Israeli
communities affected by chronic rocket fire, resilience was stronger in neighborhoods with
higher trust in leadership, more social support, better preparedness for emergency, and lower
levels of stress related to violent attacks (Braun-Lewensohn & Sagy, 2014). Communities with
the lowest socioeconomic status have less-developed resilience. Labeling, social exclusion, and
the oppression of minorities reduce the ability of a community to develop resilience, while
active citizenship and civic participation help disadvantaged communities become more resilient
in the face of adversity (Jaques, 1955). In order to increase resilience, underprivileged
communities develop practices of escaping poverty, for example, emphasizing the importance of
education for their children and creating supportive community practices.
Positive resilience helps communities avoid divisiveness and engagement in conflict as
well as protect their communities from perpetrators of violence. In her study of communities in
Baghdad, Ami Carpenter (2014) observed that “resilience to violence is about preventing conflict
escalation so as to prevent accompanying changes in how people think about themselves and
each other, changes in the way groups of people behave, and ultimately changes in the larger
community” (p. 2). Her study of neighborhood resilience in Bagdad concentrated on positive or
“conflict resilience” that was “conceptualized as a process of managing conflict escalation so as
to limit the formation of sectarian militants within bounded areas, and at the same time
preventing violent sectarian attacks from militant groups outside those areas” (Carpenter, 2014,
p. 64). In another conflict setting regarding the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Bosnian city of
Tuzla was the only city that avoided ethnic violence despite the high concentration of internally
displaced people and major problems with housing, water, waste, and transportation. Among the
factors of city resilience were its culture, long history of multiethnic coexistence and opposition
to oppression, and democratic policies of ethnic tolerance and good governance (Weiss, 2002).
Similarly, during the sectarian conflict in Lebanon, the multicultural city of Byblos avoided
descent into bloodshed and protected its Muslim minority from violence.
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Communities that have higher levels of resilience are more successful in overcoming
stresses and are better able to recover from trauma in comparison to communities that have a
lower level of resilience (Buikstra et al., 2010; Kulig, 2000). Similarly, community resilience is
strongly connected with effective post-war recovery, reducing post-war distress symptoms in
places like Israel (Kimhi et al., 2012). In Lebanon, strong ideological commitment helped
mothers and children cope with chronic violence (Bryce, Walker, Ghorayeb, & Kanj, 1989). For
refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia residing in Canterbury, New Zealand, and Tohoku,
Japan, the experience of wars, conflicts, and displacement, as well as everyday discrimination in
the host country made them unexpectedly resilient to disasters (Uekusa & Matthewman, 2017).
In the midst of violent conflict, resilience helps people reduce the conflict escalation by
creating perceptions of communities as robust and peaceful, establishing positive intergroup
relations and cooperative behaviors within their neighborhoods, and inspiring changes in the
larger community. Regarding the violent sectarian conflict, some neighborhoods in Baghdad
were able to develop resilience and remain non-violent (Carpenter, 2014). They used several
strategies to maintain this resilience: they organized non-sectarian security groups, acted as
mediators in disputes, advocated for violence prevention and resistance to violent forces, and
organized border monitoring through shifts that protected the neighborhood from outside
militias.
National Resilience to Violent Conflict
On the level of the nation, resilience to persistent conflict and violence enhances the
capacity of a national community to cope and adapt to incessant stressors. In this context,
resilience can be understood as “capacities to foster greater social and political cohesion and to
address the causes of fragility” (Ryan, 2012, p. 16). Fragility is linked to such dimensions as
authority, capacity, and legitimacy. Authority is connected with the control of violence by the
state, including the introduction of binding legislation, control over sovereign territory, the
delivery of public goods, and the establishment of a stable and secure situation within the
boundary (Gravingholt et al., 2015). A state affected by conflict can lack the authority to protect
its citizens from different forms of violence (Stewart & Brown, 2010). “Capacity” has been
described as “the state’s ability to deliver basic services to its citizens and to organize and use
resources in an effective way” (Gravingholt et al., 2015; Carment et al., 2015). Legitimacy rests
on the ability of a state to present itself as the only legitimate actor, promote electoral democracy
5

and provide protections of civic and human rights (Milliken & Krause, 2002). Fragility is also
caused by a low level of security and insufficient welfare within a state (Call, 2011). A recent
shift from the focus on “fragile states” to analyses of the state-society relationship provides a
more nuanced view on variations in instability and conflict (Stewart & Brown, 2010). With this
shift, researchers acknowledge that “situations of fragility” can be identified even within stable
and efficient states (McLoughlin, 2012; World Bank, 2011).
Social identities, as an individual’s subjective identification with social groups (Tajfel,
1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), help promote both well-being and resilience among different
groups (Sani, Herrera, Wakefield, Boroch, & Gulyas, 2012; Cruwys et al., 2014; Jetten, Haslam,
& Haslam, 2012; Khan et al., 2014), including minorities who perceive themselves as victims of
racial prejudice (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). In situations of intergroup conflict, ingroup identity has been shown to have a positive impact on well-being (Folkman & Moskowitz,
2007), however ideological commitments of specific groups can impede the development of
national resilience. By way of example, among Kosovans involved in the 1999 Kosovan conflict,
those who viewed the conflict as an identity-affirming rather than an identity-negating conflict
exhibited a better state of mental health (Kellezi, Reicher, & Cassidy, 2009). Among a group of
Israeli adolescents, a strong connection to their in-group positively contributed to psychosocial
well-being, while a weak in-group identity connection contributed to anxiety, insecurity, and
depression—all of which was set against the backdrop of political violence (Punamäki, 1996).
Similarly, the moderation effect of ideological commitment on the impact of political violence
on psychosocial well-being was found in Northern Ireland (Muldoon & Wilson, 2001).
Thus, I define and operationalize the resilience of a nation as a process that enhances the
a capacity of a national community to address conflict through adaptation, effectively resisting
perpetrators of violence, and positively transforming intergroup relations while removing
communities from the cycles of violence and war. As the literature on national resilience shows,
these processes embed contextual factors, external resources available for nations, specific
characteristics of national communities, and capacities that nations develop. In the majority of
studies, resilience is described as a process, thus the emphasis on interconnection between
different components is crucial for understanding of resilience.
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To illustrate how power of community arrives from the complex relations between these
components of resilience, I propose the Four Loops Model of national resilience that is
comprised of the:
1. Structure of conflict, including psychological, social, and structural factors
(Musallam, Coleman, & Nowak, 2010);
2. Dynamics of identity and power in national community, including salience of the
common identity, meaning of the national identity, intergroup relations, and
legitimacy;
3. External resources as policies and actions of international institutions working with
nation;
4. Societal capacities such as developed civic society, public trust in government,
effective national policies;
5. Specific practices developed and exercised by different groups within a nation. These
practices are employed by the national actors, including civic society, political
parties, NGOs, to “restore or create effectively functioning community-level
activities, institutions, and spaces in which the perpetrators of violence are
marginalized and perhaps even eliminated” (Davis, 2012, p. 6). Based on my
operations definition of national resilience, I define practices of resilience as the
developed and maintained community-level activities and institutions that help
national communities address conflict (recovery), effectively function and avoid
violence (adaptation), and reclaim their nations from perpetrators of violence
(transformation).
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Figure 1. The theoretical concept of the Four Loops model of resilience.
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This Figure 1 illustration of the dynamic model of national resilience accentuates four
continuous loops between practices of resilience and four other components of the model: (1) the
structure of conflict, (2) dynamics of identity and legitimacy, (3) societal capacities, and (4)
external resources. The term “loop” means that a factor, such as societal capacities, both
influences practices of resilience and in turn is influenced by such practices. The model provides
insights into analyzing power of a nation through an understanding of production and
maintenance of practices of national resilience, as well as changes and alterations in conflict
structure, dynamics of identity and legitimacy, and available resources through effective
practices of resilience. The empirical study presented in the paper is not used to prove the model
is right, but rather the model is employed to illustrate and explain the functioning of the power of
a nation through the dynamics of resilience in Ukraine. Thus, the Four-Loop Model serves
illustrative, not prescriptive, purposes and does not define correlations or statistical impact.
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The Case of Ukraine
Following the Maydan events that resulted in the overthrow of the Yanukovych
government, the separatist movement in the Donbas Region claimed that the Revolution of
Dignity in February 2014 was illegitimate and promoted a regional agenda that fractured the
unity of the nation (Shveda & Park Ho, 2015). Exploiting a power vacuum in these strongholds
of Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, “unarmed and armed separatists seized and occupied
regional administrations, security service (SBU), and police headquarters in Donetsk, Luhansk,
and other cities and towns in the regions” (Katchanovski, 2016, p. 8). Russian military personnel,
intelligence operatives, and public relations consultants supported this separatist movement by
providing weapons, recruitment, training, and safe haven to separatists (Czuperski, Herbst,
Higgins, Polyakova, & Wilson, 2015). Many reports also confirm direct involvement of Russian
military, resulting in the hybrid character of the warfare (International Criminal Court, 2017;
OSCE, 2017). While officially denying the military presence in Donbas, Russia stressed the
willingness to “defend” ethnic Russians and Russian speakers who live outside the Russian
Federation, thus justifying military intervention and territorial expansion. The local pro-Russian
governments were elected in self-proclaimed “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics”
(“DPR”/”LPR”).
In April, Kiev launched an anti-terrorist operation to retake the territories, but its fighting
capacity at the time was limited. As the conflict continued, volunteer groups formed to supply
soldiers and aid citizens leading to a parallel state structure (Dunnett, 2015). These “hybrid”
warfare tactics of Russian operations “were accompanied by largescale (dis)information
operations, cyber operations, various forms of economic pressure, international diplomacy, and
so on, in order to maximize the effect of the campaign as a whole” (Åtland, 2016, p. 165).
On September 5, 2014, the first Minsk negotiations led to a ceasefire agreement that was
signed by representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian governments, separatist leaders, and a
representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. On February 12,
2015, following an increase in supply of heavy military equipment from Russia and Russian-led
forces renewed offensive action, France and Germany brokered a second Minsk ceasefire
agreement, signed by the same parties as the first Minsk agreement. However, despite the
agreements, neither side has upheld the ceasefire or withdrawn all of their heavy weapons.
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The Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 did not have a significant deterrence effect on
the violence and did not create a clear path towards peace. Russia still controlled the territory and
ran elections in areas of Eastern Ukraine (Radio Free Europe 2018). The neglect of the
government and interests of the warlords contributed to the continuation of the conflict: “Same
oligarchs who distribute humanitarian assistance to residents of the Donbas are sponsoring the
violence” (Uebling, 2017, p. 266). As the OSCE mission in Ukraine reports, weapons proscribed
by the Minsk agreements still have been extensively used on both sides of the contact line,
including tanks, mortars, and artillery. Since the beginning of 2018, the SMM has corroborated
204 civilian casualties (39 deaths and 165 injuries), including 29 children (CMM, 2018). The
major cause of civilian casualties is shelling that mostly occurs during the night. The crossing of
the contact line has been complicated by a permit system and bribes by the police (Uebling,
2017). People residing in both government and non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk and
Luhansk regions have “difficulties in attending court hearings, filing legal claims and gaining
access to essential documents including birth and death certificates” (OSCE, 2017). The conflict
also has resulted in the relocation of 1.7 million people (Beyani, 2015). The farther west in
Ukraine Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) settle, the more likely they are to prefer integration,
while those re-settling closer to the conflict are interested in return. The government has not
addressed critical issues for IDPs, such as their rights to vote and to compensation,
unemployment, and lack of housing. However, some communities developed successful
resilience practices that support the integration of IDPs (Beyani ,2015). “Ukraine displays a
unique mix of enthusiasm, creativity, conflict trauma, radicalism, and disappointment with the
state. It is possible to describe this society in many different ways, but not as weak” (Udovyk,
2017). The aim of this paper is to understand factors that contribute or impede national resilience
in Ukraine.
Methods
Data Collection
Data for the study were collected in the capital of Ukraine, Kiev, during the summer of
2018 through the use of face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The interviews included eleven
questions that explored five components of the Four- Loop Model of national resilience,
including (1) the current state of the war and intergroup relations, (2) the national identity in
Ukraine and relations of power and legitimacy, (3) role of international community and
10

peacebuilding parties, (4) strengths and capacities of national community; and (5) established
and maintained practices of resilience. Each individual interview lasted between one and twoand-a-half hours.
The sample group included influential members of intellectual elite who influence the
opinion in Ukraine and, at the same time, conduct research on/write about public opinion and
social processes in Ukraine. The sampling method employed for the study included purposive
sampling and snowballing, with several diverse entry points to ensure a diversity of views and
attitudes. The final sample for individual interviews included twenty-six respondents, including
nine academics (historians, political scientists, sociologists, international relation scholars who
work as university professors or scholars in think tanks), six representatives of non-government
organizations, six government officials, three representatives of international organizations, and
two journalists. Two of the respondents were internally displaced people and five respondents
recently spent significant time in the Donbass region due to their work assignments. Ten of the
interviewees were female, and sixteen were male; the age of the participants varied from 28 to
60, with the largest group being approximately 40 years old.
The protocol of the study was approved by the IRB, informed consent was obtained
based on the approved form before each face-to-face interview. The interviews were scheduled
based on approved email or script of the phone call. All interviews were recorded with the
permission of the interviewees and transcribed for the purposes of data analysis. The interviews
were conducted primarily in English with occasional use of Ukrainian and Russian languages.
Language use was not considered as a criterion for inclusion. Given the majority of the
interviewees write and communicate in English in professional and international settings, the
English proficiency of most of the interviewees was high.
Data Analysis
A phenomenological analysis was employed to analyze the interview data.
Phenomenological research “focuses on the need to understand how humans view themselves
and the world around them” (Robson, 2011; p. 24). This method aims to answer the following
question: “What is the meaning, structure, and essence of the lived experience of this
phenomenon for this person or group of people” (Patton, 2002, p. 132). This method of data
analysis enables researchers to understand what sources of resilience people perceive in their
understanding of past events and experiences in the context of today’s discourse. Several stages
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comprise a phenomenological analysis. First, several themes were identified to manage large
data clusters without losing the deep meaning of received information or the focus of the
research questions (Robson, 2011; Patton, 2002; Dukes ,1984). I formed specific clusters by
merging similar or related themes and making a summary table of the structured themes. These
clusters were independent from the interview questions as many themes were cross-cutting
across the questions. The analysis carried out on each individual interview contributed to the
generation of common, general themes for all or most of the interviews (Saldana, 2009; Willig,
2008). The themes were then organized into five clusters related to five components of the
model: (1) structure of conflict; (2) dynamics of identity and power; (3) external resources; (4)
national capacities, and (5) practices of resilience. Specific attention was given to the production
of power through four-loops- interconnections between practices of resilience and other four
components of the model. Moreover, within each cluster, I identified subthemes which represent
the factors that define the perceptions of resilience. Within each cluster, all respondents provided
similar descriptions, thus one coherent narrative is presented to describe each cluster. While the
participants expressed a wide variety of opinions, the application of phenomenological approach
helped identify the major trends within each cluster.
The author acknowledges the limitations of the research methodology that is based on the
purposive and snowballing sample and limited number of participants. The results can only be
connected with the selected sample and do not represent the opinion of all Ukrainian people.
Moreover, the low level of consensus among the respondents made a general conclusion almost
impossible. Thus, the results of this study represent one of the possible views on national
resilience using the Four-Loop Model as an illustrative mode.
Results
The majority of respondents acknowledged the fact that Ukraine has a power as a
resilient nation and has a potential to become more resilient in the future. They stressed that
while Ukraine has experienced extensive hardships, Ukrainians have demonstrated a high level
of resiliency. As one of the respondents stated, “If Ukraine managed to recall the solidarity of the
earlier times, there is a big source for hope.” Many respondents highlighted the strength and
power of Ukrainians such as “strong Ukrainian spirit,” “the nature of Ukrainian people as having
hope,” “people are mostly optimistic and want to bring about change.” The respondents stressed
that the main infuser of resilience was the surge of volunteerism in response to Russia’s
12

occupation of Crimea and the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine. The volunteer movement filled
in the crucial gap of basic provision and procurement for the army when the state was too weak.
As one respondent pointed out, volunteerism was a very powerful effort, a “nation-constructing
movement,” in which people helped the state survive by preventing complete invasion. Other
respondents emphasized that the patriotism has grown in society because of the sacrifices and
efforts made to support the country’s army and displaced persons. A second strong component of
resilience, according to the respondents, is collective memory and the determination to prevent
violence in the future. The power of the nation arises from its ability to deal with its contentious
past. Many respondents mentioned that Holodomor (the state-sponsored famine in Ukraine
during 1932-33 that resulted in the death of millions of people) is an example of state-sponsored
violence and should be remembered by all Ukrainians in order to avoid similar situations. As one
respondent stressed, “Events like Holodomor should never happen again.”
Third, the respondents outlined the critical role of well-designed dialogue in developing
national resilience. According to respondents, dialogues help bring the people together to talk
about the situation, to identify problems, and define mutual actions. They saw the national
dialogue as a complicated process that nevertheless helped rebuild trust with the government, the
rule of law, or societal trust within the community. According to respondents, this foundation
will help Ukraine become a more powerful nation in the future.
The first and the most important factor that impacts power and resilience of a nation, as
discussed by the respondents, is the war and violence in Ukraine. While some of the respondents
described the conflict as a unifying factor against the common enemy, other respondents stressed
the importance of finishing the war and reintegration of Ukrainian territories as foundational
factors of national resilience. As one respondent stressed, “We could not build a resilient nation
in a situation of war, we need to return all our occupied territories.”
The first subtheme stressed that the war is very disempowering. A quarter of the
respondents expressed a pessimistic view on the future of the conflict and stated that Donbas
may be lost and a political solution would not prevail. They see conflict as a war between Russia
and Ukraine and stress a need of liberation from the occupiers. As one respondent discussed,
“This war will never end. Putin will never permit the liberation of this space because it would be
political suicide.” They do not see any current reintegration measures as feasible and assess the
conflict as a long-term, low-intensity conflict. Some respondents stressed that both sides
13

continue to be deeply involved and committed to violence with no concerns for civilians’ lives
and well-being. For them, the best possible scenario is turning current war into a “frozen
conflict.”
The second subtheme, expressed by more than a third of respondents, represented
decentralization as a form of power sharing and distribution of power from the center to the
regions. Such decentralization efforts allow for the Eastern regions to remain a part of Ukraine
while having a higher degree of local authority. However, the respondents stressed that a
referendum that would allow Eastern Ukrainians to vote on a decentralization measure is
unlikely to succeed because of the deficiency in institutional trust toward Ukrainian elections
within the Eastern territory, and a sabotage by Russia.
The third subtheme described the conflict in Donbas as not rooted in ethnic identity, but
as the ideological conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Among roots of conflict, almost all
respondents stressed the role of Russian media and propaganda in inciting and sustaining the
war. They discussed the influence of Russian media in both Crimea and the Donbas regions and
emphasized the importance of fighting Russian propaganda. As one respondent emphasized, “It
is a myth that if Russia leaves, the conflict will end.”
According to the respondents, to succeed in this war and empower the nation, Ukraine
has to win the hearts and minds of the people and to successfully reintegrate and reunite the
country. Other respondents noted that the residents of Eastern Ukraine have the agency to an
extent in this process and that their needs (pensions, etc.) should be recognized within a process
of bringing them into the fold of mainstream Ukrainian national identity. Another respondent
noted that the tie between national identity and economic conditions are strong, stressing that
“we need economic methods to rebuild the national identity.” For the nation to reintegrate
effectively, another respondent declared simply that “People should know that if they live in
Ukraine, they will live better.” To reintegrate, the impression of “greater safety, better education,
and a future” should be communicated to those living in Eastern regions.
The fourth subtheme underlined the tension between “justice and peace” as the main
challenge to the reintegration of occupied territory. As one respondent stated, “The long-term
goal for the country is not merely to eliminate or defeat Russia, but to restore justice for both
victims and offenders.” They discussed the debate in the Ukrainian society on whether an
amnesty for perpetrators should be allowed, and to what extent war crimes should be prosecuted.
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One respondent noted that “if granted, amnesty would not be tolerated. Peace is not possible if
there was no punishment. People would say we capitulated before the republics, and no one was
sufficiently punished.” However, other respondents emphasized the importance of ending
violence. Some respondents also mentioned the importance for the Ukrainians to answer the
moral question and determine whether the Ukrainians from the East are “terrorists or victims.”
However, a quarter of the respondents expressed the doubts regarding the integration and
believed that it would be better for Ukraine to allow the Donbas region to remain independent
and rather invest the resources in addressing domestic problems.
The second theme discussed by the majority of the respondents is the theme of political
and economic change as a foundation of national community power and resilience. The first
subtheme described the fight with corruption as the most important factor of the empowerment
of Ukrainian nation. Some respondents emphasized that the war on corruption has the same
importance as the war in the East of Ukraine. As one respondent stated, “We have two wars in
Ukraine: one in Donbas and one on corruption. And the second is even more crucial.”
The second subtheme discussed the imperative role of reforms and building democratic
political institutions for power and resilience in Ukraine. The respondents stressed that to build
Ukraine as a modern European state, the reforms should have a strategic nature. As one
respondent outlined, “Ukraine could not become resilient without complete overhaul of the
political institutions and building a modern democratic state.”
The third subtheme underlined the importance of public trust in Government, police, and
law for developing resilient Ukraine. Many of respondents discussed the low level of trust in
these institutions among Ukrainian public and stressed that the resilience in Ukraine should rest
on the restoration of public trust.
The fourth subtheme outlined sharing power as a significant factor of national resilience.
The respondents discussed the role of compromise and democratic deliberation in nationbuilding in Ukraine as well as inclusion of different political parties in the governance. As one
respondent discussed, “Ukraine should include all political parties in the national dialogue,
instead of excluding or stigmatizing them.”
Finally, the fifth subtheme described the development of economy as a crucial foundation
of national resilience. Several respondents discussed poor economic conditions and a low level
of life among Ukrainian citizens. They emphasized the importance of improving the well-being
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of people as a part of national resilience. As one respondent stated, to bring peace, Ukraine
“must fulfill the basic human needs of all citizens.” According to the respondents, the problem of
unequal distribution of wealth, such as pension benefits for citizens living in the Eastern region,
becomes an important problem for the Ukrainian government. As another respondent stated,
“You could not build resilient and successful nation if most of its people are poor and are
struggling to put a bread on their table.”
The theme of shared identity, civic engagement, and common understanding as a
foundation of a powerful and resilient nation was the third most common theme among our
respondents. The first subtheme emphasized that nationalism diminishes the ability of the nation
to become powerful and resilient. Multiculturalism was the predominant concept expressed by
the interviewed participants, however the meaning of multiculturalism differed between the
respondents. The first group emphasized the existence of several ethnic groups such as Russians,
Hungarians, Pols, Tatars, Jews, and Romanians. The respondents believed that ethnic diversity
makes it impossible to unify Ukraine as an ethnic entity. As one respondent stated, “Ukraine
had no choice but to be multicultural. Thus, the best way to describe Ukraine is multicultural
since it incorporates many languages and nationalities.” However, many participants expressed
concern that nationalism that rises in the situation of conflict diminishes the ability for the
country to come together. As one respondent stated, “many Ukrainians are pro-Ukranian and
insist on the Ukranian language and history as part of their narrative, rather than understanding
or developing an all-encompassing concept of diversity at the core of their identity.”
Another group of respondents connected multiculturalism with civic meaning of identity,
emphasizing vast existence of different multi-ethnic groups within the Ukranian territory and
noting that resilient Ukraine should be political and not an ethnic nation. They see Ukraine not
as an ethnic territory but rather as a political entity granting citizenship to people residing in it.
As one respondent stressed, “Political identity unites and strengthens the nation while
nationalism divides people.” Yet, another participant explained that the revolution of Maidan
had mixed all people of Ukraine into one nationality.
However, some respondents stated that multiculturalism is not appropriate for Ukraine.
They argued that Ukraine has historically been oppressed and the boundaries of identity are
murky or vague. As one participant stressed, identity is a “chimera in that it does not exist.” They
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also stated that ethnic minorities are too small to support the label of multiculturalism, and all
minories, such as the Russians, will eventually disappear from Ukraine.
The second subtheme stressed the importance of common history, culture, and language
for the developing of national resilience. The respondents stated that celebration of common
holidays, speaking the Ukrainian language, and promotion of Ukrainian culture contribute to the
strength of the nation. As one respondent noted, “Ukraine is a resilient nation as it has been able
to preserve its language, culture, and identity through centuries of the occupation.” The
respondents also mentioned the importance of cross-regional exchange and stressed that travel to
different regions and tourism contribute to growing understanding between people, as well as the
appreciation of Ukraine. As one respondent mentioned, “People began to see the beauty of
Ukraine, its trans-Carpathian region, and they are proud of their country.” Another important
outcome of such exchange, according to our respondents, is the development of common
Ukrainian identity. Finally, some respondents discussed how young people can benefit from
regional exchange. As one respondent stressed, “Our young people should know about their
country and different regions. It will make us more resilient to external threats.”
The third subtheme emphasized the importance of the development of a strong civic
society and civic responsibility among the population. The respondents stressed that the
EuroMaydan was a foundation for further development of the civic society, an inspiration for the
nation, and a source for its power. Respondents noted that people have gone to the line of
conflict to provide supplies, food, financial support and psychological support. In my
observation of how these organizations provide for members of their community, I see that
people have started to understand that they don’t need to rely on the state for their basic needs.
In support of that statement, the respondents noted that volunteerism helps people to connect
with one another. As one respondent reiterated “in many cities and towns in Ukraine, people are
starting to come together to discuss issues and work on resolution and development.”
The respondents discussed the importance of self-awareness and education for the
development of resilient nation. According to them, the state and civil society should promote
understanding of citizenship and belonging to the nation among Ukrainian people. They
discussed the importance of involving more young people in civic activities and raising
awareness among them about their civic responsibilities. As one respondent stated, “The

17

EuroMaydan has delineated the responsibility of the citizens for their country. It should be
promoted among all segments of population, especially youth.”
The fourth theme discussed by the majority of the respondents is that of international
interventions as the most effective way to resolve the Donbas conflict. The first subtheme was
supported by the overwhelming majority of respondents who stressed that Ukraine couldn’t
resolve this conflict alone. Almost all respondents stressed that the West needs to be better
informed and more involved in Ukraine with a clear and cohesive strategy. The ignorance
exhibited by the West and the international community about dynamics of this conflict were
stated to be a root cause of some of the ineffective policies that are currently being enacted. One
of the primary solutions to this dilemma offered by experts is the direct involvement of
international institutions and international figures in Ukraine. According to the respondents the
absence of coordination within the international community derives from each country having its
own vision of how the process of conflict resolution should be carried out and what the future of
Ukraine should look like. Overall, a majority of the respondents noted that the international
involvement in the conflict “must be political” in ways that promote a more resilient and
effective Ukrainian state. The respondents also would like to see more involvement of former
Soviet states like Georgia or the Baltic States, and countries that have had similar experiences
like Croatia.
Among the most important roles of the international community, the respondents
mentioned peacekeeping and the enforcement of the Minks Agreements. The respondents
described two roles of peacekeeping mission: on the line of contact, as an impartial arbiter
honoring the ceasefire commitments and, on the border between Russia and Ukraine, as an
administrator organizing and holding a referendum. One respondent noted, “The mechanism
should be an international peacekeeping mission headed by an “international transitional
administration… this is the only way.”
Most the respondents had negative opinions about the Minsk Agreements and referred to
the process as a “laughable political theatrics.” As one respondent stated, “the Minsk process
leads nowhere. The Ukrainians don't believe in the Minsk agreement;” another respondent
echoed, “Minsk is a bad agreement, we should not implement it.” One of the most significant
reasons why the process is flawed, according to the majority of respondents, is Russia’s strong
influence within the negotiations as a third party, despite Putin’s direct involvement and deep
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interests in the conflict perpetuating. They stress that the conflict is not a civil war but rather a
regional fight between Russia and Ukraine. One respondent noted that the irony of the situation
is that the “Separatists are just puppets for Russia” and they do not hold power in the process of
negotiation. However, some of the respondents, while being critical of the Minsk agreements,
see them as the only available option. Many respondents expressed the belief that diverting from
this path could result in a deterioration of the conflict resolution process.
The second subtheme was connected with the assessment of international economic
sanctions against Russia. Some respondents believed that economic sanctions against Russia will
put “permanent political and financial pressure” on the government as well as shift the focus on
internal matters from territorial interests. Many respondents emphasized that economic sanctions
need to be increased, suggesting that the current sanctions are too mild and are not holding
Russia accountable. Some respondents mentioned that the West needs to be better organized and
noted contradictions—with some Western powers maintaining economic relations with Russia,
even in Crimea, while still imposing economic sanctions. However, other respondents
emphasized the economic and cultural bonds between Russia and Ukraine assuming that the
sanctions against Russia might also posit a threat to Ukraine because it is difficult to separate one
from the other. As one respondent stated, “If Russia collapses, Ukraine will receive many
refugees.”
Many respondents also mentioned the role of foreign aid for the economic development
of Ukraine and resolution of conflict. One dimension where this could potentially help is that
greater economic development and improved infrastructure would make the reintegration with
Ukraine a more appealing option for the territories in Eastern Ukraine. Finally, improvement in
these dimensions could help to create a state that would be more resilient and better able to resist
future conflict driven by both internal and external factors.
The third subtheme reflected the need to enforce the peace through military force.
Recognizing that Ukraine has no military power to fight with Russia, some respondents believed
that the support from the United States, the European Union, or the United Nations will provide
an effective military solution in the fight against Russia. The majority of these respondents
mentioned the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 as a claim for support. Some respondents urged
the need for a quick return of Donbas and restoration of Ukrainian territory. They also stressed
that this course of action may prevent future conflicts and tensions with Russia.
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Discussion
The production and functioning of national power through the interrelations between
main components of national resilience can be further illustrated by the Four Loops Model
presented in the beginning of the paper (see Figure 1). More specifically, it shows how the
structure of conflict, societal capacities, external resources, and dynamics of identity and power
influence national power by contributing to the development and sustainability of resilience
practices. At the same time, effective resilience practices change the structure of conflict,
increase societal capacities, improve effectiveness of external resources, and reduce contestations
of identity and legitimacy.
A majority of respondents described Ukraine as a resilient nation that has the power to
overcome many hardships. According to them, the central components of resilience- practices
are (1) volunteerism, (2) critical approach to history, and (3) dialogues (as depicted in the center
of Figure 2). According to respondents, these practices contribute to patriotic feelings, civic
responsibility, and mutual understanding as foundations of resilience.

Figure 2: Model of national resilience in Ukraine.
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The structure of conflict is perceived as both disempowering (creating challenges) but
also empowering (contributing to the resilience of the Ukrainian society). The control of
powerful Russia over the occupied territory leads to the pessimistic view on the conflict as a
long-term, low intensity conflict that can become frozen for decades. The decentralization
approach is perceived as not probable because of the low trust of Ukrainian authorities among
the population of occupied territories, and sabotage of the referendum by Russia. Another
negative factor is the active role of Russian media and propaganda in inciting and sustaining the
war. However, the respondents acknowledged the importance of agency for people on occupied
territory and the essential need to win their hearts and minds. The support for the reintegration
among these people depends on the ability of Ukraine to develop its economy and foundations
for well-being for all its citizens. However, because of the economic problems and ideological
differences with occupied territories, a significant part of the Ukrainian population does not want
to integrate these territories back to Ukraine. Finally, respondents emphasized that the dilemma
between peace and justice reflected in the debates about punishment and amnesty can posit
another challenge for national resilience. The results of interviews resonate with survey results in
the Ukraine SCORE (2018) study. The SCORE survey showed that many people in Ukraine
experience fatigue and dissolution due to conflict (6.9 on the scale from 1 to 10)—thus
supporting the point of view that the protracted violent conflict is diminishing resilience of the
nation (Ukraine SCORE, 2018).
Several factors discussed by the respondents are connected with the dynamics of identity
and legitimacy in Ukraine. The corruption was outlined as a major impediment for national
power and resilience that impacts all levels of society and leads to the stagnation. These results
were similar to outcomes of several other studies. The survey of International Republican
Institute showed that the Ukrainian public has perceived the importance of both issues equally:
the war (53 percent) and corruption (49 percent) (IRI, 2018). The importance of overcoming
corruption was also shown by the SCORE survey: people of Ukraine consider it very important
(7.9 on the scale from 1 to 10) (Ukraine SCORE, 2018). The results of the Public Opinion
Survey of Residents of Ukraine 2018 with regard to the consequences of corruption shows that
74 percent of interviews think that corruption demoralizes the society, and 72 percent think that
corruption increases social and economic inequality (Center for Insights in Survey Research,
2018).
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The building of the powerful and resilient nation, according to the respondents, requires
significant reforms and secure democratic political institutions. Resilient Ukraine should be a
modern European state that promotes sharing power, compromise, and democratic deliberation.
This opinion of respondents is also validated by the results of the SCORE survey that show a
strong support for reforms (7.2 on the scale from 1 to 10). The survey of National Democratic
institute also demonstrated overwhelming support for fully functioning democracy (84 percent of
Ukrainian citizens) (NDI, 2018).
The meaning of national identity was discussed as one of the most important
determinants of its power and resilience. The majority of respondents positioned the ethnic
concept of national identity as an impediment for resilience of Ukraine, stressing that nationalism
divides the country and excludes some groups of the population. This idea was also supported by
the SCORE survey that show the prevalence of pluralistic national identity (7.0 on the scale from
1 to 10) (Ukraine SCORE, 2018). One group of respondents promoted multicultural meaning of
national identity, emphasizing ethnic diversity and the importance of equal rights for all ethnic
groups in Ukraine. Another group of respondents emphasized the importance of civic meaning of
identity and equal citizenship of all people as a foundation for national resilience. Yet, a small
group of respondents rejected multiculturalism as appropriate for Ukraine and emphasized the
overwhelming majority of ethnic Ukrainains as a core of national identity.
The salience of common identity was also outlined as a foundation of national resilience
and power. According to respondents, the salient national identity rests not only on common
history, culture, and language but also on cross-regional understanding and appreciation of
Ukraine as a country for all its citizens. Cross-regional exchange and in-country tourism to
different regions create stronger connections and contribute to the resilience of the nation to
different external threats.
Among societal capacities for resilience, the respondents discussed development of a
strong civic society and civic responsibility among Ukrainian population. Robust and vibrant
civic society was cited as a crucial foundation for national resilience. However, while
EuroMaydan and volunteerism inspired many people for civic engagement, the level of civic
participation is still very low. The importance of increasing civic engagement was also
supported by the SCORE survey that showed a very low level of civic activities (0.6 on the scale
from 1 to 10) (Ukraine SCORE, 2018). Another important capacity that needs further
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development, according to the respondents, is an understanding of citizenship and belonging to
the nation among Ukrainian people. Economic development and well-being of all citizens was
also mentioned as a crucial societal capacity that also requires significant improvements. The
SCORE survey additionally showed the low level of economic security among Ukrainian people
(4.9 on the scale from 1 to 10) (Ukraine SCORE, 2018).
The external resources were considered by the respondents as vital for national
resilience. International interventions were discussed as the most effective way to resolve the
Donbas conflict. However, the low level of understanding of the dynamics of the conflict and
insufficient coordination between international actors were emphasized as impediment to the
process. Peacekeeping operations were perceived as a prospective approach to the termination of
violence and reintegration of Ukraine. However, the current approach to peacekeeping was
described as deficient. The respondents had a very critical view of the Minsk agreements but
decided that they should be followed as the only available option at this time. The policy of
economic sanctions against Russia was considered a strong deterrent that has to be further
increased and better executed. Sanctions should be accompanied by economic aid to Ukraine that
will help the country become a more stable, successful, and powerful state. Finally, some
respondents promoted the importance of military support and involvement of international
military forces in the conflict.
Conclusion
This study centers on the following questions: how is power of a national community
produced and exerted through dynamic interrelations between the components of national
resilience? What practices of resilience aim at the effective adaptation, resistance to violence,
and positive transformation of relations within the nation? In comparison with other approaches
to national resilience, the Four-Loop Model provides a more comprehensive view of the
concentration of a nation’s power relative to the interrelationships between components of
resilience, mutual impact between them, and connection of resilience to the structure of ongoing
conflict and dynamics of identity and legitimacy within the nation.
The first advantage of the Model is that it increases understanding of interrelations between
conflict and national resilience, stressing the interrelations between factors of empowerment and
disempowerment. The Model describes practices as actions and institutions developed to address
disempowering factors related to the structure of protracted violence, including (1) long-lasting
23

low intensity conflict, (2) Russian control over occupied territory, and (3) internal conflict
between peace and justice. In addressing these components of conflict, the Ukrainian nation has
developed practices that aim to protect the nation, reduce trauma, and address the needs of the
community, including volunteerism, critical approach to history, and dialogues. By employing
these practices, the Ukrainian nation creates a possibility to reduce the effects of protracted
violence through nation-wide activities and discussions that empower national community.
The second advantage of the Four-Loop Model of national resilience is the emphasis on
the production of national power through close links between national resilience and
international interventions. Some practices that increase national resilience and empower the
Ukrainian nation—such as volunteerism—rest on the assessment that international intervention
is ineffective in a situation of protracted violence. As military involvement and the Minsk
agreements became ineffective, people of Ukraine increased their geopolitical agency. Other
practices, including dialogue, strengthen the connection between national and international
actors. The emphasis on economic sanctions against Ukraine and Ukrainian economic
development underline the belief that economic power is as one of the most important avenues
for conflict resolution in this context. It is also a dynamic which requires international assistance,
as either of these strategies are unfeasible without a strong support from the international
community. In turn, these practices increase trust among Ukrainian citizens in the international
community and contribute to the efficacy of the international policies, including sanctions
against Russia.
The third advantage of the Four-Loop Model of national resilience its recognition of the
production of power through the interrelations between practices of resilience and societal
capacities available within the nation. The resilience practices are built on these societal
capacities, including civic society, active citizenship, and economic well-being, as they are
established and maintained in a nation that is efficient in utilizing these resources. However,
these practices are both built on the available societal capacities and contribute to their
development. Thus, practices of volunteerism rest on, and promote, the increase of social
resources, including civic society and active citizenship. The practices of dialogue and a critical
approach to history are built on already developed active citizenship and help Ukrainian citizens
address issues of economic well-being as a national capacity.
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Finally, the fourth advantage of the Four-Loop Model is its emphasis on the production
of national power through the connection between practices of resilience and identity and
legitimacy dynamics in the nation. The participants underlined the crucial role of an inclusive
society, multicultural or civic meaning of national identity, common culture and mutual
understanding, and national self-esteem and pride as building stones for national power. For
example, multicultural meaning of national identity and the need for mutual understanding
suggest the need for a national dialogue. In turn, practices of volunteerism and dialogue help
develop inclusive civic nation. Similarly, systemic political change, democratic institutions,
reforms, and trust building contribute to critical approach to history and dialogue, while these
practices help increase accountability of the government and development of public trust.
In comparison with other models that concentrate on changes in the national community
related to social-psychological dimensions such as patriotism, optimism, and social integration
and political dimensions such as strength of democracy and trust in leadership (Canetti,
Waismel-Manor, Cohen, & Rapaport, 2013), the Four Loop Model of national resilience in
Ukraine emphasizes the production of power of the nation based on interrelations between
agency of national community and dynamics of protracted violence. It describes national
resilience as a process of enhancing a capacity of a national community to heal from trauma,
effectively resists perpetrators of violence, and positively transform intergroup relations
removing communities from the contexts of chronic violence and war. Instead of seeing
themselves as victims of Russian intervention and as a divided nation with the weak and
corrupted Government, citizens of Ukraine were empowered to mobilize resources, capacities,
and strengths of the national community to address chronic violence. The practices of resilience
developed by the national community of Ukraine, including volunteerism, critical approach to
history, and dialogue, do not only aid Ukrainians in the adaptation to the chronic violence but
also in the transformation of the nature and the impact of the violence on the national
community.
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